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6.1 INTRODUCTION
The disintegration of economic blocs or countries always results in a sharp 
decrease in economic interaction between their past constituencies. These 
trends may vary regarding their speed, magnitude, nature, and the degree 
to which different countries are affected. The decline may last decades 
and have a sizeable underlying inertia. Hence, the main question concerns 
the way in which these disintegrative trends are managed, whether the 
partners can find alternative forms of cooperation, and whether the future 
development can counterbalance the centrifugal forces.
Accordingly, the likely professional hunch regarding the current 
economic trends in the post-Soviet space would be an ongoing gradual 
decline in cooperation. ‘Only’ 27 years after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, any other outcome of this research would constitute a major sur-
prise. Nonetheless, there are many forms and variations of decline, which 
is why the quantitative research has to be supplemented by a cautious 
and in-depth interpretation. What are the structural drivers, models of 
development and growth in the region? Are there any alternative powers 
of gravity? Do the countries try to suppress disintegrative trends, and 
how do they overcome their consequences? What role do the political 
considerations and the integration projects play? Looking beyond the 
statistics may provide a more justified view of where this long-lasting 
trend may lead, and what kind of sustainable cooperation can be formed 
between the post-Soviet countries in the years to come.
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This chapter provides an overview of the economic interlinkages be-
tween post-Soviet countries and their major trends. Section one briefly 
outlines key economic drivers within the region since the early 1990s. 
Section two delves into the statistics of the issue, relying primarily on 
foreign trade indicators as the most reliable and accessible sources, but 
also foreign direct investments (FDI) and, where applicable and relevant, 
labour movements and financial transfers. The third section discusses the 
role of post-Soviet integration projects and simultaneously the issue of 
alternative gravity centres, like the EU and China. The chapter concludes 
by sharing some thoughts on the integrability of regional countries.
6.2 THE SPECIFICS AND DYNAMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET 
ECOSPHERE
There are two conventional views on post-Soviet economic coopera-
tion. The one with the stronger political-macroeconomic focus interprets 
regional ties as a Soviet legacy, where value chains and industrial ties 
inherited from Soviet Union times prevail. According to this view, this 
cooperation is doomed to decline since, with Soviet technology becoming 
increasingly obsolete, countries are turning to other, lucrative markets. 
Politics may slow down this process by making financial sacrifices, but 
in the longer run structural drivers point towards disintegration.1 The 
other view, based more distinctly on corporate strategies, looks at the 
region as a whole. Foreign multinationals, car makers, agricultural and 
pharmaceutical producers, and banks do not enter Russia, Kazakhstan 
or Ukraine separately. They establish their assembly lines for a handful of 
regional markets due to similar cultural segmentation of demand, lower 
customs levels, infrastructural and geographic proximity, or simply to 
gain access to bigger markets. For emerging local companies, foreign 
expansion almost always starts by entering the neighbouring countries 
through trade or investments. According to this discourse, some regional 
ties are normal and can be exploited with synergies, opening up possi-
bilities for a new kind of regional cooperation.2 
Elaborating on this scene, we have some ‘strange species’ in this re-
gion, like Belarus, which created its ‘long survival story’ with a partially 
upgraded, but unreformed economy.3 Preserving its Soviet industrial 
patterns, it launched a brutal export offensive based on the CIS area and 
1 Aslund 2013. 
2 Deuber and Romanova 2015.
3 See Ioffe and Yarashevich 2011.
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achieved relatively high growth rates. Belarus still conducts more than 
60% of its foreign trade with post-Soviet countries, and its share of total 
intra-regional turnover grew from 7.3% to 23.5% between 1994 and 2016.
Consequently, when one examines post-Soviet economic cooperation, 
it is reasonable to treat the region as a particular ecosphere with the local 
countries or corporations as its subjects. Each subject accommodates 
to its surroundings, implementing its strategy in a post-Soviet sphere 
that plays various roles in different contexts. Some may coexist with this 
environment, some have moved to the borderlands and only partially 
depend on it, while the larger subjects can even try to transform the 
place where they live. The totality of these strategies coupled with a good 
deal of path dependency constitute the region and determine its future 
patterns. Accordingly, it is important to take stock of these peculiarities, 
and identify some of the paradigms of the given ecosphere.
1. Russia has a monolithic share among the post-Soviet economies. In 
2017 it represented 75.3% (IMF data at current prices) of the regional 
GDP, up from 67% in 1992.4 The second-ranked Kazakhstan had a mere 
7.9%, despite steadily catching up after the Soviet breakup. For com-
parison purposes, it is like a European Union, where the 19 Eurozone 
countries (in 2016 their combined share was 72.9%) create a single 
entity and form an economic region with the other 9 EU members. 
The post-Soviet regional set-up is concentrated around Russia, in-
dependently of Moscow’s ambitions or policies.
2. The regional growth rate lags behind the global rate, as these coun-
tries could not establish a sustainable model for catching up. Between 
1992 and 2016, annual average growth rates were 2.2% within the 
post-Soviet area versus the global 3.7%. What is more, the post-Soviet 
recovery from the 2008–09 crisis was even more sluggish. The average 
annual regional weighted growth between 2008 and 2016 represented 
1.3%, two percentage points below the global level. All of this suggests 
that old cooperation patterns still retain some of their relevance, and 
have not been replaced by new mechanisms and development drivers. 
3. The only means of relative prosperity has been through hydrocarbon 
exports. If we add Belarus to the group of net energy exporters (from 
the macroeconomic point of view this is justified since its economic 
4 In terms of data sources, unless indicated otherwise, under post-Soviet space I have included the 12 former 
Soviet countries (not the Baltic states). I have used IMF World Economic Outlook and World Bank data for 
GDP and general macroeconomic indicators. For foreign trade and some intra-regional comparisons, I have 
referred to CISStat, which does not include data on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In this regard, unless 
indicated otherwise, post-Soviet (or alternatively CIS) foreign trade includes only 10 countries. The foreign 
trade data for Georgia after 2009 has been supplemented with data from the national statistical provider. FDI 
data has been collected from UNCTAD and some expert and national providers. Other sources are indicated in 
the text.
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growth has a slightly positive correlation with with oil price hikes 
due to Russian implicit subsidies5), the average performance of the six 
energy exporters exceeds one of the importers on a GDP PPP per capita 
basis almost threefold (17,198 USD vs 6273 USD in 2015). Hydrocarbon 
exports are strongly disintegrative in terms of regional cooperation. 
While in the short run they may provide a certain complementary 
impetus between exporters and importers due to high regional ener-
gy intensities and price hikes, in the medium and longer run exports 
go to the advanced economies outside the region. Furthermore, rent 
revenues from oil and gas push elite mindsets towards less cooperative 
outcomes, where national economies can stand alone and complex 
value chains in manufacturing and processing industries and services 
are less important.
4. Power legitimization through economic growth and prosperity have 
not become an exclusive priority in the region. While in Western de-
veloped countries elite legitimization tends to rely heavily on eco-
nomic performance, regional political systems often pursue nation 
building and/or great power agendas in order to maintain their social 
support. While in some cases local elites opted for economic consoli-
dation instead of national self-identification (Belarus in the 1990s and 
early 2000s) or could pursue these policies in parallel (Kazakhstan), 
these two trends often substitute each other. The wish for economic 
consolidation provided the most efficient stimulus for integration 
efforts by far.
5. The state remains a key actor in most of these countries independently 
of its capabilities. Paternalistic expectations are high in these societies, 
while dirigist solutions and heavy reliance on state ownership, when 
applicable, remain popular among the elites. At the same time, market 
reforms and liberalization are rare occurrences in the region (a partial 
exception being Georgia). These features correlate well with the more 
authoritarian political systems of the energy exporters, while lead-
ing to permanent economic and social imbalances in other countries 
(namely Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova). 
Although these characteristics paint a gloomy, inward-looking picture 
of the post-Soviet space, the regional megatrend had been one of liber-
alization and gradual opening until the 2014 sanctions and protectionist 
shifts in Russia. The combined foreign trade of the CIS countries (except 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) grew 8.3 times between 1994 and 2014, 
twice as fast as global trade. Eight countries from the region joined the 
5 According to the IMF, the 2015 oil price drop had a modest but negative impact on Belarusian GDP growth, 
ranging between 0 and 0.5 per cent. IMF Staff Report – Belarus 2015, p. 8. 
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WTO with significant liberalization commitments. The level of foreign 
direct investments caught up to the lowest level of the CEE range on a per 
capita basis after 2005 in the more developed countries, like Russia and 
Kazakhstan (UNCTAD). Keeping in mind the relatively slow average GDP 
growth and the low initial basis, the openness of these economies has 
grown significantly since the late Soviet years. This is natural given that 
the Soviet Union was a closed entity, only loosely connected to the world 
economy. After 1991, in the midst of the Soviet economic collapse, these 
countries were only able to find markets, capital and modern know-how 
outside the region.
At the same time, local economic setups have only partially evolved 
into export-driven models. Unlike the new EU member states from CEE, 
where foreign trade/GDP indicators have doubled or tripled and had risen 
above 150% (except in Poland and Latvia) by 2016, the post-Soviet average 
remained around 80% (World Bank). Foreign multinational companies 
have never acquired system-building characteristics in the local econ-
omies. While they could acquire significant shares in some sectors, the 
backbone of national performance was provided by companies with do-
mestic owners and by state-owned actors. Foreign multinationals engaged 
the region primarily driven by different motivations from those in the CEE 
countries. In the latter case efficiency-seeking, and access to a low-wage, 
educated workforce above all, constituted the primary objective, while 
in the post-Soviet space resource- and market-seeking considerations 
remained dominant.6 Apart from the quasi-unreformed Belarus and 
Turkmenistan, the region’s economies constitute various kinds of hybrid 
capitalist formations, where the mental and policy patterns of Socialism 
remain relatively strong, while the most fundamental systematic and 
institutional transformative steps have been taken and are effective.
Intra-CIS economic relations have to be examined on the basis of 
these ambiguous fundaments. With the exception of Belarus and some 
smaller states, economic opening meant that intra-CIS relations grad-
ually lost their importance within external ties. The regional share of 
intra-CIS turnover in total foreign trade decreased from 34.5% to 19.1% 
between 1994 and 2016. This did not indicate a decrease in absolute terms 
on the current USD basis, as the total trade volumes grew almost three-
fold. Compared to local combined GDPs, the share of intra-CIS trade has 
retained much of its share today, and in some cases it may even have 
increased since the early 1990s. This comes as no surprise given the high 
level of barter trade within the region, and particularly the artificially low 
energy prices until the late 2000s. These price rises influenced the data 
6 This hypothesis was also positively tested by broad surveys among companies in four CIS countries. See 
Kudina and Jakubiak 2012.
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tremendously both at the total foreign level, and at the intra-CIS trade 
levels in particular. 
Given the economic collapse in the 1990s and the determined search 
for alternative markets, the fall in regional cooperation during the first 
decade was understandable. What is more noteworthy is that the intra-CIS 
trade share was unable to grow thereafter during the years of recovery 
and high growth in the 2000s: it constituted 27.8% in 2000 and only 
21.5% in 2008. During this period, there was an opportunity to establish 
new forms of regional cohesion, and revitalize former value chains and 
sectoral cooperation. Nonetheless, economic consolidation brought a 
further decrease in post-Soviet trade and FDI flows, and external ties 
proved to be more sustainable than intraregional ones. A good explana-
tion for this is the intensive growth in the global economy. The decade 
preceding the financial crisis was the Golden Age of the world economy. 
An abundance of capital in advanced financial markets pushed Western 
FDI to semi-peripheral, emerging markets. High growth rates implied 
rising raw material prices, creating favourable conditions for energy and 
metal exports, and boosting local mining sectors. Between 2000 and 2007, 
Russian hydrocarbon exports increased by 42.5% in volumetric terms, 
Azeri oil production tripled, while Kazakh production doubled. During 
these years, external markets were in pretty good shape, explaining some 
of the decline in intra-CIS shares.
In this regard, the years after 2008 are particularly interesting. The fall 
in the intra-CIS share in total trade decelerated significantly, decreasing 
from 21.5% to just 19.1% between 2008 and 2016. The main decrease 
occurred in 2014, with the Russia-Ukraine conflict clearly playing a con-
siderable role. Nonetheless, some symptoms emerged before 2014. After 
the financial crisis, the risk appetite for emerging markets decreased 
considerably. Post-Soviet energy production also started to plateau: 
Russian export volumes grew by just 13.8%, Kazakh oil production by 
23.6% until 2017, while Azeri drilling started to gradually decline. This 
is a strong indication that the region is reaching the limitations of its 
extensive growth. It does not mean that high prices could not boost the 
region again temporarily. What it does mean is that regional countries 
cannot increase their production much further, their production costs 
will likely rise through reserve substitution, and these two factors will 
imply less rent and budgetary income measured at constant oil and gas 
prices in the years to come.7
2014 may constitute another milestone in terms of Russia’s shift to-
wards import substitution and a more protectionist stance. While this 
7 A more detailed analysis of Russia is provided by Gustafson 2012.
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trend has emerged in the wake of Western sanctions and Moscow’s coun-
ter-sanctions, the liberalization agenda had been losing ground prior to 
the Ukrainian crisis. The implementation of the WTO rules remained rather 
isolated and did not expand into a wave of economic liberalization, as in 
China. The protectionist agenda has long been propagated at the level of 
the Kremlin primarily by Sergey Glazyev, senior advisor to the President. 
Given the protectionist Zeitgeist even in the Western hemisphere, it is 
reasonable to say that protectionism will remain a major temptation in 
the post-Soviet space, and it remains to be seen how it will affect in-
tra-regional cooperation.
6.3 THE STEPPING STONES OF DECLINE
Foreign trade is the most accessible and reliable indicator of regional co-
operation. As Table 3 shows, the share of intra-CIS trade fell in all ten of 
the countries under study, apart from Tajikistan (for which, along with 
the Caucasus Republics, the base year of 1994 is somewhat misleading 
because of their respective armed conflicts). Nonetheless, the magnitude 
of decline is rather different from country to country. Belarus, and to 
a lesser extent Armenia, retained their heavy reliance on CIS markets, 
namely Russia to an overwhelming degree. Intra-CIS foreign trade is 
less concentrated in the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, for which 
Kazakhstan constitutes their biggest export outlet and the second larg-
est source of imports. In all of the other cases, the significance of the CIS 
decreased gradually with some fluctuations.
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The first factor worth examining is energy trade, as it constitutes the 
primary reason for decline. In the case of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
the drop is most likely connected to the rise in their oil production. With 
Astana heavily and Baku excessively dependent on hydrocarbon exports, 
the bulk of their production goes outside the region,8 so their performance 
can easily be attributed to this single fact. This may also be true of Russia, 
although it has a more complex relationship in this matter due to its role 
as a major supplier of gas and oil to the region. 
Nonetheless, CIS energy trade has a high level of price responsive-
ness, and high energy prices may trigger a robust downward trend in 
trade volumes. In 2003, at a time of low energy prices, 43% of Russia’s 
exports to the CIS consisted of mineral fuels. Given the low gas and, in 
the case of Belarus, low oil export prices, these shares are comparable to 
the extra-CIS levels (the respective share for non-CIS exports was 59.5%). 
This went up to 55.3% (72.7%) by 2011, only to plummet by 2017 to 33% 
(63.4%). Nonetheless, while Belarusian and Armenian imports remained 
flat in terms of volume, Moldovan imports fell substantially and Ukrainian 
imports shrank even further, with the result that its consumption of oil 
and gas has practically halved during the last 15 years. The transformation 
8 In 2017, 89.5% of Azeri and 69.3% of Kazakh exports were mineral fuels. In the Kazakh case, only 4.4% of all 
mineral exports went to the CIS.
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Azerbaijan 53.2 39.6 37.8 20.9 23.3 25.4 26.0 7.2 14.4 10.8 9.4 16.0
Armenia 59.6 35.4 27.7 20.8 26.7 24.7 28.6 30.0 28.0 29.6 28.8 30.3
Belarus 64.0 66.2 68.6 65.5 62.4 63.4 54.9 56.0 56.8 58.2 59.1 60.9
Georgia** 78.9 45.0 34.8 34.7 40.4 39.4 38.8 33.7 32.6 31.7 31.3 28.9
Kazakhstan 59.6 60.3 43.1 36.6 32.2 31.1 26.9 26.2 26.2 25.2 23.7 28.5
Kyrgyzstan 65.8 65.5 49.4 48.3 45.8 51.6 52.1 54.0 50.1 53.5 49.7 42.3
Moldova 72.0 64.0 52.5 42.9 45.1 46.0 38.6 36.4 34.9 34.6 28.5 23.8
Russia 23.9 23.2 21.8 18.6 16.9 18.3 14.7 14.5 14.6 14.8 12.7 12.5
Tajikistan 31.3 49.6 49.6 64.0 50.5 44.3 41.2 44.1 44.8 45.0 45.6 50.1
Ukraine 64.0 58.1 44.3 43.9 38.2 38.5 39.4 37.6 40.5 38.9 29.7 19.3
Table 3: The share of intra-CIS trade in external trade, 1994–2016, %*
Source: CISStat, Geostat
* Complete data unavailable for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; 
** data for years after 2009 from Geostat.ge
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from low prices and high volume trade to global pricing had a negative 
effect on turnover. Soft pricing still plays a considerable role in keeping 
Russian exports to Belarus and Armenia high.
Besides and partly because of the shrinking share of energy in Russian 
exports, the product structure of Moscow’s foreign trade within the CIS 
remains relatively ‘evenly distributed’. It does not have a distinguished 
profile, hinting at the existence of complex value chains. This is in marked 
contrast to its non-CIS turnover. Russia’s energy supplier status vis-à-vis 
other, European and Asian countries is well-reflected in its trade statis-
tics: almost two-thirds of its exports consist of fuels and more than half 
of its imports comprise machinery and transport equipment (Figure 4). 
At the same time, the Russian CIS trade structure does not have the same 
trenchant features of division of labour. Due to the decreasing share of 
energy, little complementarity has remained in the intra-CIS trade struc-
ture. It looks more like trade between entities of similar economic setups. 
While this does not exclude the existence of some verticality of particular 
sectors, successful integrations are based on broad complementarity and/
or complex value chains, penetrating the whole economy. This might 
impose a considerable constraint on future deepening of cooperation 
between the parties.
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Another surprising phenomenon is the distribution of intra-CIS trade 
between countries. Normally when a system falls apart, the relations 
between its smaller and distinct entities suffer more than those with its 
bigger units. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 4, it was not Russia that was 
boosting its share within post-Soviet trade, but Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
The Kazakh data, as well as the steep decline in Ukrainian proportions 
can be partly attributed to their respective rise and fall in GDP shares. 
The Belarus data is somewhat misleading, as its intra-CIS trade almost 
completely covers Russia (above 85%). Furthermore, the relative rise in 
shares of EAEU members between 2005 and 2016 may be a result of trade 
diversion due to the customs union (as indicated later in this chapter).
The relatively low data for Russia, especially if compared to Moscow’s 
significantly higher share in post-Soviet GDPs, raises some doubts re-
garding the business underpinnings of its reintegration efforts. Despite 
all of the integration measures at the political and macroeconomic level, 
it was unable to boost its role as the centre of trade within the region. 
This is likely and primarily a consequence of Moscow’s political conflicts 
and economic statecraft policies, and the use of trade embargoes with-
in the region. Most notably, bilateral trade with Ukraine, once a major 
constituency of intra-CIS relations, fell by 74.2% between 2013 and 2016. 
Meanwhile, Russian trade ties with EAEU members or in politically neutral 
cases have remained intact or have even deepened, as was the case with 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Table 4: The distribution of CIS foreign trade between 10 countries, 1994–2016, %
Source: CISStat
 1994 2005 2016
Azerbaijan 1.6 2.0 2.1
Armenia 0.7 0.6 1.2
Belarus 7.3 15.5 23.5
Georgia 0.8 1.2 2.1
Kazakhstan 8.3 10.4 13.4
Kyrgyzstan 0.9 0.8 1.8
Moldova 1.8 1.2 1.1
Russia 50.2 43.8 44.5
Tajikistan 0.7 0.9 1.5
Ukraine 27.7 23.6 11.0
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Another important issue is inward foreign direct investments (iFDI) 
and their trade creation. Given the methodological and reporting prob-
lems, it would be difficult to identify FDI flows on a bilateral, or even on 
an intra-regional basis. Suffice it to say that according to the Russian 
Central Bank, the combined level of the CIS in Russian outward FDI was 
ranked in only 21st place on a nominal basis – an obviously absurd figure. 
Hence Table 5 presents only combined iFDI levels on a per capita basis, in 
an attempt to map out some possible ways in which foreign investments 
affected post-Soviet trade levels. As mentioned above, average post-Soviet 
iFDI levels remain moderate, suggesting that new value chains did not 
fundamentally reshape the economic landscape. Energy exporters tend 
to have higher iFDI stocks and this may play a role in changing economic 
orientations. Turkmenistan is the most radical example of how Chinese 
gas investments boosted iFDI and created a new and exclusive trade rela-
tionship in less than a decade (in 2017 83.6% of Turkmen exports went to 
China, and the Russian share in its foreign trade was 3.7%). However, in 
the case of the other countries, there are no convincing indications that 
iFDI influences trade and interconnects the subjects.
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6.4 THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION AND ITS POTENTIAL 
CHALLENGERS – THE EU AND CHINA
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a grand project to reintegrate 
certain regional countries, replaying the EU integration roadmap. It cur-
rently has five members – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Armenia. In 2010 the three former countries ‘recreated’ the customs un-
ion, and in 2015 they established the Eurasian Economic Union, formally 
introducing the common market with the ‘four freedoms’ (movement of 
goods, capital, services and labour) within it. The Union aims to abolish 
administrative and non-tariff barriers from trade and other movements, 
creating a single market by 2025.
 
1997–00 2001–04 2005–08 2009–12 2013–16
Azerbaijan 330.0 667.1 1,050.4 951.1 2,079.6
Armenia 92.3 254.9 793.7 1,571.6 1,551.0
Belarus 107.0 178.9 425.7 1,211.6 1,878.9
Georgia 111.8 285.2 1,030.3 2,121.9 3,185.0
Kazakhstan 494.1 1,129.8 2,575.9 5,787.0 7,260.4
Kyrgyzstan 78.0 100.2 179.0 371.0 703.0
Moldova 71.9 164.3 409.9 763.3 877.0
Russian Federation 126.8 577.2 1,995.6 2,930.8 2,446.2
Tajikistan 17.7 30.5 67.1 164.6 232.0
Turkmenistan 174.5 329.6 760.7 2,948.0 5,549.3
Ukraine 60.8 146.6 677.2 1,218.6 1,194.5
Uzbekistan 22.7 36.2 73.8 210.8 293.7
 
Post-Soviet average (12) 140.6 325.0 836.6 1,687.5 2,270.9
New EU-member average (11) 898.3 2,326.6 5,720.8 7,408.0 7,828.9
Baltic states average (3) 866.8 2,360.2 5,899.7 7,648.1 9,413.9
Table 5: Inward FDI stock per capita levels for the post-Soviet countries, 1997–2016, USD
 Source: UNCTAD FDI Statistical Database
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There are several doubts regarding the future of the EAEU, addressed 
in greater detail in Part One. The weightiest argument concerns the fate 
of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) between 2000 and 2010, 
which ended in total disarray. This was due to the fact that the EurAsEc 
applied the Russian tariff regime as the common external tariff, which was 
significantly higher than those in many other member countries. Hence, 
the EurAsEc raised significant barriers in and caused trade diversion 
from Central Asian states to Russia. At the same time, given the CIS free-
trade arrangements, EurAsEc members could enter each others’ market 
even before, providing no extra benefit for non-Russian producers from 
the customs union. Consequently, EurAsEc members did not apply the 
common tariff regime at their external borders in full but only selectively, 
causing a chain of trade wars within the region and ending up preserving 
internal customs practices.
The failure was instructive when establishing the EAEU. Obviously, 
Russia had to offer the other EAEU members some preferential access to 
its markets. This has been achieved by making three modifications. First, 
while the Russian tariff regime was taken as the basis for common external 
tariffs again, Moscow joined the WTO in 2012. This reduces unweighted 
(weighted) average tariffs, and common tariffs will decrease accordingly 
from 11.5% (13%) in 2011 to 7.9% (5.8%) by 2020. Consequently, even if 
tariffs may have risen moderately since 2015 for Kazakhstan, Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan, by 2020 they will erode back close to their former national 
levels. In this regard, the region remains on the path of economic opening. 
Second, the abolishment of non-tariff barriers is far more important 
than the decrease in the already diminishing customs tariffs. According 
to surveys and an econometric analysis conducted by the Centre for 
Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank in 2015, non-tar-
iff barriers amounted to 39.8% ad valorem in Kazakh exports to Belarus, 
14% of the value of its exports to Russia. Lower, but dimensionally similar 
values were published for other directions.9 The bulk of the trade dis-
putes since 2015 have been related to these non-tariff barriers, primarily 
referring to different technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards. 
Enhancing access to the Russian market would compensate for the tem-
porary Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Armenian loss on the tariff issue and provide 
them with long-term advantages. The major problem here is that the ef-
fective Soviet system of standards (GOST) stipulates mandatory technical 
regulations, while the WTO’s agreements apply SPS and TBT regulatory 
mechanisms, based on much more flexible voluntary principles. Most of 
the regional countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus accepted 
9 Vinokurov et al. 2015. 
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legislation calling for adherence to the EU’s SPS regulations. This would 
eliminate many of the current health and safety standard problems and 
enhance competitiveness both within the EAEU and outside. At the same 
time, the conversion is proceeding slowly and the establishment of the 
EAEU has created new problems, raising the issue of harmonization be-
tween the five members. Another option in order to speed up standardiza-
tion would be the use of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) regarding 
each other’s mandatory technical regulations. As the example of the EU 
shows, both of these practices may take decades, perhaps even between 
entities sharing a common past.10
The third issue among Russia’s economic offer is the broadening of 
the customs union to a common market with four freedoms. Obviously, 
these issues and the related risks were the major short-term motiva-
tions for some countries, most notably for Kyrgyzstan and Armenia to 
enter the EAEU. Given that the EAEU provides free movement of labour 
for members’ citizens, both countries received legal guarantees of free 
work migration to Russia and Kazakhstan. As Table 6 shows, remittances 
from Russia make a considerable contribution to local GDPs in the case of 
Armenia, Moldova and Uzbekistan, while they are essential constituencies 
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Those who joined the EAEU are equipped 
with some legal guarantees that these transfers remain largely free of 
labour force regulations. 
10 Tarr 2016.
Table 6: Net remittances from Russia and their share in the respective GDPs of post-Soviet 
countries, 2013–17, bln USD, %
Source: IMF, CBR
 
Net remmitances Remmitances/GDP
 2013 2015 2017 2013 2015 2017
Armenia 1.41 0.66 0.69 12.67 6.25 5.97
Kyrgyz Republic 1.69 1.06 1.82 23.04 15.87 25.41
Moldova 1.18 0.48 0.43 14.78 7.89 5.32
Tajikistan 3.59 1.97 2.38 42.21 25.07 32.70
Ukraine 2.83 0.97 0.58 1.58 1.07 0.53
Uzbekistan 6.10 2.55 3.56 10.57 3.83 7.43
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With the exception of Russia, the EAEU amounts to the integration 
of the more interdependent countries within the CIS. Nonetheless, its 
integration levels remain far below the indicators of the European Union. 
In 2013, only three countries within the EU had more non-EU trade than 
intra-EU turnover (the UK, Malta and Greece), and the average share of 
intra-EU trade was 62%. At the same time, as can be seen in Table 3, only 
the Tajik and Belarusian intra-CIS trade levels exceeded 50% in 2016, and a 
major proportion of the respective national economic interests lay outside 
the CIS or EAEU. Hence, the EU may be a false benchmark both regarding 
expectations and as a future model for development.
There have been two major enhancers of EAEU progress to date. First, 
the formation of the EAEU went hand-in-hand with liberalization and 
global economic integration efforts. Russia’s WTO accession was a major 
game changer in the odyssey of post-Soviet economic integrations, while 
the future conformity with WTO/EU SPS standards would also mark a 
step towards the global competitiveness of local industries. Hence, if the 
EAEU were to become a facilitator of regional liberalization and potentially 
add some extras within its borders, it could preserve its role as a sizeable 
institutional entity in Eurasia. This effort has been further underlined 
by the recent EAEU trade policy offensive and conclusion of a free trade 
agreement with Vietnam, another cooperation agreement with China, 
and attempts to sign similar treaties with Iran and Serbia. Putin also 
offered free trade agreements to a number of partners in the name of the 
EAEU, such as Turkey and the EU. These measures and declarations to a 
great extent aim to broaden recognition of the EAEU and raise its pres-
tige. Consequently, their substantive parts have to be viewed with some 
caution at this point, and all the more so when considering that trade 
liberalization goes against Moscow’s current turn towards import sub-
stitution and protectionism. This may also become a major challenge for 
the EAEU. Theoretically, Moscow cannot raise its customs tariffs so easily 
because of its WTO and EAEU membership. Nonetheless, the protectionist 
stance may endanger the implementation of past EAEU commitments re-
garding trade facilitation or could make this process much more complex 
vis-à-vis other members. 
The negative results of Moscow’s protectionism can be counter-bal-
anced by the EAEU’s other enhancer, through access to the relatively big 
Russian market and even more importantly to Moscow’s concessions and 
subsidies. In this regard, the EAEU can also be seen as a quasi-Comecon,11 
11 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was an economic organization that existed between 
1949 and 1991, established by the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. While Comecon functioned as 
a way of dismantling Western economic influence within the Soviet Bloc, the Eastern European communist 
countries often used it as a channel for requesting additional Soviet aid and economic concessions.
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where the major rationale for member countries is to establish an en-
hanced dialogue with Russia and monetize its goodwill. This happens on 
a permanent basis with Armenia and Belarus, which receive low-price 
energy. Moscow also pledged development aid and preferential invest-
ments to Kyrgyzstan, and maintains security guarantees and access to 
the arms market in the case of Armenia. 
Despite all of these dedicated efforts on the part of Russia, past expe-
riences show that an integration trajectory cannot be maintained beyond 
certain limits by relying exclusively on ad hoc subsidies and sectoral co-
operation. In this regard, the future of the EAEU lies in the abolishment of 
trade and other barriers and the member states’ adherence to the rules. In 
this respect, the Russian ‘counter-sanctions’ since 2014 on a wide range 
of agricultural and food products from Western countries posed a major 
test. None of the member states joined the ban. This goes against the 
common trade policy principle, according to which all similar decisions 
should be taken at the EAEU level. Legally, the problem can be resolved 
by strictly applying the rules of origin agreement concluded within the 
CIS and in force in all EAEU countries. At the same time, local exporters 
in Belarus and potentially in other member countries slipped through 
these loopholes and re-exported Western products to Russia as domestic 
ones. Moscow had to react with the same technical and sanitary measures, 
repeating the problems that had arisen with the EurAsEc.
The analysis of EAEU achievements in the last three years is further 
complicated by the major economic fluctuations caused by the 2014 cri-
sis in Ukraine, sanctions, and the drop in the oil price.12 Nonetheless, one 
of the major issues concerning measurement relates to the way in which 
the EAEU rearranges the regional ties with alternative centres of econom-
ic gravity. On the Western frontier, the EU and its neighbourhood policy 
posed a challenge to Russian reintegration efforts, while in Central Asia 
China has become a huge magnet. Besides the EAEU, approximation to 
these economic entities is the driver that could change the post-Soviet 
inertia and may have a decisive role in the future of the region.
12 Vinokurov (2017) provides a positive assessment for the first couple of years.
  
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Georgia
CIS 40.2 38.6 39.2 37.1 37.0 41.8 35.9 30.4 32.4 34.7 29.6 32.8
EU 18.8 19.7 22.8 25.3 28.6 23.6 28.0 27.9 26.7 26.3 28.7 26.7
Moldova
CIS n/a 59.3 47.2 47.0 46.4 43.0 37.4 35.8 35.5 32.8 25.4 23.0
EU n/a 31.1 43.9 42.1 42.9 43.8 46.9 45.8 45.1 45.6 53.3 54.9
Ukraine*
CIS n/a 49.1 42.5 42.0 37.8 39.1 39.6 39.0 42.0 35.6 24.2 19.8
EU n/a 27.9 30.4 32.1 36.0 32.0 33.0 29.3 29.0 31.2 37.5 41.3
Table 7: EU and CIS shares in Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian foreign trade, 1995–2017, %
Source: National statistical providers
* Ukrainian data after 2014 excludes Crimea and the conflict zones of Eastern Ukraine
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As shown in Table 7, in the case of the three EU DCFTA countries, CIS-
EU competition tends to be in favour of the European Union. CIS shares 
from total foreign trade fell in all three cases and these decreases were 
intense, especially in Moldova and Ukraine after 2014. The EU grew in 
importance, although this was expected and partly the result of its en-
largement from EU15 to EU28. In the case of Moldova, one can speak about 
some sort of European orientation, albeit in a highly peripheral role. This 
was the only country out of the three EaP states that could compensate 
for the loss of its CIS trade in the European markets. 
In the case of Georgia and Ukraine, the combined CIS and EU shares 
cover only around 60% of total foreign trade, painting a more fragmented 
picture without clear trade policy profiles. Paradoxically, Georgian ex-
ports to the CIS grew substantially after Tbilisi exited the organization in 
2010. Given this setup, it is highly questionable as to what kind of benefits 
strict adherence to the EU acquis may provide if less than 24% of Georgian 
exports go to the Union. The case of Ukraine cannot be separated from 
its conflict with Russia and loss of major industrial centres. Foreign trade 
statistics between 2013 and 2017 very tellingly reflect these changes. It 
remains to be seen how the country will overcome the shock and whether 
it can enter the European markets in the longer run. 
Nonetheless, all three countries would need decades of robust growth 
and catching up in order to enhance economic convergence with the EU. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that economic development could 
be maintained in a macroeconomically stable manner. Without such de-
velopment, these countries may be stuck with their current status. Free 
trade with the EU without improving local competitiveness may have 
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disadvantageous effects and could fall short of society’s expectations. In 
such an environment, nostalgia for Soviet markets would remain a basic 
ideological and economic asset in the hands of Moscow, permanently 
challenging the adherence and integrity of institutional ties with the EU. 
Optimally, the EU and CIS market segments are complementary and 
can diversify local exports substantially. The CIS still represents markets 
for declining industrial sectors, especially in the Ukrainian case, can 
absorb agricultural and food surpluses from Georgia and Moldova, and 
may serve as a stepping stone for entering the post-Soviet space for EU 
investors in light industry or some manufacturing branches. Meanwhile, 
EU markets may save local economies from pro-cyclical crises stemming 
from Russia and still sweeping through the whole region, as happened 
in 1998 and 2014. Hence, the rivalry between Russia and the EU and the 
strict and short-term optionality between the EAEU and EU DCFTA was 
rather damaging from the economic point of view.
The coexistence of China and CIS/Russia in Central Asia has been sof-
tened by the lack of solid institutional optionality. While Moscow actively 
propagates the EAEU among these countries, China has not elaborated 
a similar integration pattern, and economic relations largely remain at 
the bilateral level. At the same time, the lack of visible conflicts masks 
an even more rapidly changing landscape and shifts in economic orien-
tations. As depicted in Table 8, China is a major trade partner in these 
countries, and became the biggest by far in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. Chinese influence is not restricted to trade, however: it 
actively seeks access to local energy resources, invests in related sectors, 
acquires ownership through local value chains, especially in retail or light 
industry, and provides loans and infrastructure construction capabilities 
under the label of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Table 8: The foreign trade of Central Asian countries with China and the CIS, 2016, bln USD, %13
Source: CISStat, Observatory of Economic Complexity
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Total (bln USD) 62.11 5.57 3.93 11.83 24.31
CIS (%) 28.5 42.26 50.08 n/a 34.81
China (%) 13.62 48.48 44.79 45.04 14.52
13 Data from this region is highly contradictory, especially as far as Tajik, Kyrgyz and Uzbek providers are 
concerned. This might be partly due to the different registration of product flows for statistical and customs 
purposes. It is particularly true for Kyrgyz and Uzbek gold and precious metal ore exports, providing up to 
40% of the respective flows.
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The Chinese influence in the region has general characteristics similar 
to those of its penetration in Africa and Latin America. Beijing is success-
ful in engaging smaller and more vulnerable subjects. As far as the two 
smaller Central Asian countries are concerned, suffice it to say that China 
produces their respective annual GDP in less than six hours. The loyalty 
of the local elites can be bought relatively easily and even the smallest 
offers in terms of development aid can boost these countries substantially. 
The landscape becomes more balanced due to the more diversified ex-
ternal relations of the two regional majors, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 
Kazakhstan, China’s role has been growing much more gradually than in 
the other cases. The reasons for this are manifold. Kazakh oil reserves lie in 
the Western part of the country, in the Caspian Basin, very far away from 
Chinese industrial centres. Furthermore, the Kazakh oil industry had been 
largely established and consolidated by the start of Chinese engagement in 
the mid-2000s. Moreover, the Kazakh leadership pursues a multi-vector 
foreign and foreign economic policy, where Chinese investments could 
have only a limited role. Accordingly, Chinese FDI amounted to only 14.8 
bln USD (around 7% of the total, or around 10% if Hong Kong is added), 
primarily concentrated in transportation, mining and finances. In the 
case of Uzbekistan, the country remained closed and hardly accessible 
for any foreign investments and with little export potential. The former 
feature may change due to the rotation in the presidential position, if it 
were accompanied by some change in economic policy. 
What is Russia’s stake, and how does the EAEU relate to the challenges 
posed by the EU and China in the respective regions? It is widely believed 
that the EAEU confronts Western and Chinese penetration in different 
ways in the member states. This has been achieved by mutually exclusive 
integration projects between the EU and EAEU and underlined by Russia’s 
deliberate efforts to articulate the EAEU’s position regarding Beijing’s 
initiatives. The member states try to retain their autonomy in external 
economic policy as far as possible: Armenia signed a Comprehensive 
and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in February 2017, and 
Astana objected to premature Russian statements on several occasions in 
the name of the EAEU and demonstratively expressed its wish to maintain 
its independence within the legal frames. Multi-vector reflexes are also 
present on the other side: in May 2018 the Moldovan president successfully 
applied for observer status within the EAEU.14
From a more analytical angle, Moscow’s challenge is much more 
complex. First, it has to deliver on its past pledges and abolish trade 
barriers within the EAEU. The fate of EurAsEc permanently haunts the 
14 The status of this action remains unclear since it needs internal approval and implementation by other 
constitutional entities.
152    FEBRUARY 2019
EAEU initiative and if the project fails to provide some benefits for the 
parties, its erosion will be inevitable. Moscow’s rush for international 
entrenchment of the EAEU, and the attempts to push for recognition in 
the EU and globally have been made in part to prepare for these negative 
outcomes. Second, Russia also has to take a position in the liberalization/
protectionism dilemma. At this point, it still seems to be easier to keep 
the EAEU together with a moderate liberalization agenda. The experienc-
es with Russian counter-sanctions, with partners taking considerable 
distance from Moscow, are highly indicative in this regard. The problem 
in this respect is that an opening up of the economy has become the less 
favourable choice in Moscow.
Third, and most importantly, Russia will represent its own economic 
interests within the EAEU and regarding CIS countries. As Table 9 shows, 
the CIS countries’ share has been decreasing consistently and substan-
tially in the last decade. The CIS region provides roughly just one-tenth 
of Russian foreign trade and minuscule proportions of FDI. This is in 
sharp contrast to Russian foreign policy priorities, where the region is 
designated as the most important area of Moscow’s interests. While the 
Kremlin certainly channels significant funds for these objectives, and 
Table 9: Russian exports to and imports from major regions of the world, 2005–17, mln USD, %
Source: Russian customs statistics
Exports 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Total (mln USD) 241,451.7 351,928.2 301,666.5 516,480.9 525,976.3 343,511.8 357,766.8
CIS (%) 13.5 15 15.5 15.4 14.1 13.1 13.4
EU (%) 55.2 55.7 53.3 51.6 537 48.2 44.6
APEC (%) 12.4 12.2 15 17.9 18.9 22.8 24.1
 
Imports 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Total (mln USD) 98,707.5 199,753.1 167,348 305,604.5 315,297.5 182,902.3 227,464.2
CIS (%) 19.2 15 13 14.7 12.4 11.6 10.9
EU (%) 44.2 43.7 45.1 41.7 42.6 38.4 38.2
APEC (%) 25.6 31.9 30.9 33.8 34.6 37.9 40.3
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state companies may sidetrack their normal business activities, limits are 
imposed. Hence, it is reasonable to say that CIS and EAEU policies cannot 
stray too far from mainstream foreign economic policies and definite-
ly cannot contradict them for a prolonged period of time. In the event 
of conflicts, Moscow will likely not harm its own business groups and 
self-serving interests. Russian foreign policy has to be adapted to struc-
tural economic processes from time to time. 
6.5 CONCLUSION
The forms of economic integration in the post-Soviet states are relative-
ly low. At the current stage, the common market, represented by the 
EAEU, is ‘state of the art’ regional integration, with reasonable doubts 
regarding its future potential and capabilities. At the same time, the al-
ternative integrative mechanisms in the region are also rather humble: 
the EU offers its Eastern partners free trade with legal approximation. The 
former is definitely loose cooperation in the age of global liberalization of 
trade, while implementation of the latter certainly exceeds local capacities. 
China does not try to integrate regional countries, but establishes bilateral 
ties and acts according to its interests. Chinese influence transforms the 
regional balance without harbouring transformative ambitions. In such 
a landscape Russia can maintain some of its economic leverage given its 
relative strength because of the lack of competition.
No swift change is to be expected in these respects. The post-Soviet 
region has a sui generis integrability problem. Political elites are inter-
twined with local businesses, corruption is rampant, the regional average 
TI Corruption Perception Index ranking is 123 out of 180, with all regional 
countries above 100 apart from Georgia and Belarus. Foreign companies 
enter the region in order to access its resources and tap local demand, 
but not in order to set up complex value chains and establish produc-
tion capacities with high human added value. The gradual erosion of the 
region’s weight in the global economy, the low competitiveness, and all 
the concerns regarding the decline of local processing industries are clear 
indications of this trend. The region will likely also reach its limitations of 
extensive growth in hydrocarbon production in the coming decade. The 
end of this megatrend, stretching from the 1960s through the collapse of 
the Soviet Union until today, may serve as the last wake-up call for local 
economic policies.
Given the lack of development drivers and complex, vertically inte-
grated value chains, the local economies provide little complementarity 
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for strong integration. They remain rent-seeking systems based on some 
sectoral cultures and their export potential. In such an environment, 
economic integration may prove useful, but limited in its scope. As the 
experience of APEC demonstrated, economic cooperation is possible on 
the basis of a system of dense bilateralism, without supranational integra-
tion mechanisms. The move away from multilateralism could be further 
accentuated by the current shift in the region’s economic focus towards 
the Asia-Pacific region.
This might change the standard business culture and economic behav-
iour of the region and Russia. Currently, much of the post-Soviet region 
distances itself from Europe in terms of foreign trade, FDI, and economic 
cooperation. Russian and Central Asian business cultures more closely 
resemble those in the Asia-Pacific region, where political ramifications 
are still important for business, megadeals with complex verticalities 
are present, state companies provide the negotiation benchmarks and 
business goes beyond economics. In this regard, the current regional 
business cultures may remain as they are, with no change from outside 
to be expected.
